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Abstract
Are individual preferences for skewness fixed or fungible? Using preference reversals as a case 
study, we find evidence that preferences remained stable as reversals disappear due to 
arbitrage across both market-like and non-market contexts.
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1 . Introduction
Depending on the beholder, a researcher sees a person’s preferences for risky events as either fixed
or fungible. Most economists view fixed preferences as a valuable precept, a fundamental building
block that has served them well in describing behavior within active exchange institutions (see e.g.
Krugman, 1998; San Miguel et al., 2002). Many psychologists counter that preferences are fungible,
more affected by non-economic contextual cues than economists have acknowledged or admitted (see
e.g. Slovic, 1991; Tversky and Simonson, 1993). The question of preference stability matters for
theory and public policy because if preferences are ‘transient artifacts’ contingent on context, so are
the welfare measures used in cost–benefit analyses to rationalize or reject regulations to protect health
and safety.
Herein we examine the stability of preferences of people who fall prey to the classic anomaly of
preference reversals (e.g. he prefers lottery A to lottery B, but then puts greater monetary value on B
1than A). Using experimental data and panel econometrics, we estimate an empirical model of
preferences for risk and skewness—the love of the long shot—as we compare behavior in market-like
arbitrage settings and non-market settings. Our results show that preferences remained stable even as
arbitrage removed preference reversals. People stopped reversing preferences with arbitrage not
because their preferences were fungible, but because they initially overpriced the risky long shot.
2 . Data
We use data from a lab experiment with 123 subjects (Cherry et al., 2003). The experiment
consisted of six sessions of three treatments; each treatment had 41 participants with 12–15 subjects
in each session. After entering the lab, participants signed a consent form acknowledging their
voluntary participation while agreeing to abide by the instructions. Written protocols ensured
2uniformity across sessions, and all subjects were inexperienced with preference reversal experiments.
2 .1. Treatment 1
In this baseline treatment, subjects faced two independent settings that create conditions likely to
induce people to reverse their preferences. In each setting, subjects were faced with two monetary
3lotteries: a p-bet lottery and a $-bet lottery. Subjects were asked which lottery he or she preferred,
4and how much they valued each of the two lotteries. Preferences and values were binding in both
settings, e.g. subjects were sold lotteries for their indicated value. But inconsistent preferences and
values (reversals) were not arbitraged. The process was repeated with different lotteries for 15 periods.
2 .2. Treatment 2
Subjects faced the same setting as in the baseline treatment except now in one of the two
settings—themarket-like setting, reversals were subject to arbitrage. In this market-like setting, if a
subject’s preferences did not match their values, the simulated market would engage the person in
buys, sells and trades to extract profits from the inconsistency. For instance, if a person said he
1Preference reversals have been documented for isolated individuals in numerous lab experiments run by both economists
and psychologists (see Grether and Plott, 1979; Tversky et al., 1990). One explanation of preference reversals argues the
decision maker constructs preferences on the spot instead of ranking the options. The strategies when constructing
preferences include ‘anchoring and adjustment, relying on prominent dimension, eliminating common elements, discarding
nonessential differences, adding new attributes into the problem frame in order to bolster one alternative, or otherwise
restructuring the decision problem to create dominance and thus reduce conflict and indecision’ (Slovic, 1991, p.500).
2The protocol included: randomly seating the subjects as they entered the room, disallowing any communication
whatsoever among subjects, reading the experimental instructions aloud as the subjects followed along, administering a test
of comprehension, addressing any questions or concerns raised by the subjects, and conducting the market sessions.
Experimental instructions are available from the authors on request.
3A p-bet is a relatively safe lottery with a high probability of winning a smaller reward; a $-bet is a relatively risky lottery
with a low probability of winning a larger reward.
4Following past work by Grether and Plott (1979), value was defined as the ‘fair value’ that the subject was willing to buy
and sell the lottery. The constraint of WTP and WTA being equal does not interfere with the purpose of this study (see
Cherry et al., 2003).
preferred lottery A to B, but valued A at $2 and B at $5, the market would sell him B for $5, then
exchange B for A—his preferred lottery, and buy back A for $2. The net result is he did not own any
lottery and he was $3 poorer. Previous work has documented this type of money pump discipline
forces a person to reconsider and realign the inconsistencies of her preferences and values (see Berg et
al., 1985; Chu and Chu, 1990). Choices and reversals in thenon-market setting were not subject to
arbitrage.
2 .3. Treatment 3
Subjects faced the same setting as in treatment 2 except that the non-market setting without
arbitrage was hypothetical. In the market-like setting, the subject’s indicated preferences and values
over the monetary lotteries were binding and subject to arbitrage. In the non-market setting, the
5subject’s preferences and values were non-binding, i.e. hypothetical.
The resulting data provides observed behavior of 123 people indicating preferences and stated
values over two lottery pairs in 15 periods—3690 choices over lottery pairs and 7380 values over
individual lotteries.
3 . Empirical model
We use Golec and Tamarkin’s (1998) and Garret and Sobel’s (1999) empirical model to test for a
preference for skewness (also see Ali, 1997; Woodland and Woodland, 1999). Each player has an
identical utility function and bets her entire wealth. Losing a lottery bet returns zero to the bettor.
Playerj’s expected utility depends on the top prize payouts of each lottery game in optioni, and she
only plays those lottery games available in option. Playerj’s expected utility in optioni is:
n
E U 5P ?U X 1O P ?U X (1)s ds d s dji Gi ji Gi gi ji gi
g51
whereg denotes all lottery games exceptG which is the highest top prize game,P is the probabilityGi
of winning the highest top prize gameG in option i, U (X ) is playerj’s utility from winning the topji Gi
nprize X in gameG in option i, ando P ?U (X ) captures all other lottery gamesg offered inGi g51 gi ji gi
option i except the highest top prize game in gameG in option i. This term is the probability of
winning the top prize in any gameg multiplied by playerj’s utility from winning the top prize,X , ingi
any gameg summed over alln of g games. The two terms in Eq. (1) reflect the expected utility for
player j for all lottery games available in optioni, U .ji
Normalize utility U (X )51 and impose the preferences restriction that the odds between theji Gi
gambles are selected to make the lottery players indifferent between the outcomes of gameg or G,
which allows us to rewrite Eq. (1) as:
E U 5P 5P ?U X 5P ?U X 5 ? ? ? ? ? ? 5P ?U X (2)s d s d s ds dji Gi 1i ji 1i 2i ji 2i ni ji ni
5The arbitrage mechanism began after period 5 in treatments 2 and 3 to allow a baseline comparison in the early periods
across treatments.
Given any lottery gameg or G in option i:
E U 5P 5P ?U X (3)s d s dji Gi gi ji gi
or
PGi
]5U (X (4)s dji giPgi
The expected utility for any player in optioni is represented by equating the probability ratio of the
highest top prize gameG and any other lottery gameg to playerj’s utility from winning the top prize
any gameg. To empirically test Eq. (4), we define the following cubic approximation (Golec and
Tamarkin, 1998; Garret and Sobel, 1999):
PGi 2 3
]5 b 1b X 1b X 1b X (5)f g0 1 gi 2 gi 3 giPgi
whereb measures the bettor preferences over the mean of returns,b measures bettor risk aversion1 2
(b . 0 risk loving; b , 0 risk aversion;b 50 risk neutrality),b measures the bettors preference2 2 2 3
for skewness (b . 0 favorable preference for skewness;b ,0 unfavorable preference for skewness;3 3
b 5 0 indifferent preference for skewness). Ifb .0, b , 0, andb . 0—lottery players are risk3 1 2 3
averse, and choose to play those lotteries with greater skewness of returns. Our panel data allows us to
expand on previous work by modifying the empirical specification in two ways. First, we interact the
independent variables with period indicator variables to estimate any change in subject preference and
Table 1
The impact of arbitrage on preference reversal rates (%)
Round Market Non-market
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
1 0.317 0.341 0.317 0.317 0.317 0.366
2 0.34 0.366 0.268 0.366 0.317 0.341
3 0.39 0.317 0.342 0.341 0.293 0.39
4 0.293 0.341 0.293 0.39 0.366 0.341
5 0.366 0.39 0.268 0.293 0.317 0.39
6 0.317 0.366 0.317 0.317 0.341 0.317
7 0.341 0.317 0.244 0.39 0.31 0.366
8 0.317 0.219 0.22 0.341 0.244 0.317
♦ †9 0.268 0.146 0.171 0.415 0.244 0.244
‡ † ♦10 0.341 0.122 0.146 0.341 0.22 0.190
† † † †11 0.317 0.122 0.122 0.366 0.170 0.190
† † † ♦12 0.268 0.098 0.122 0.317 0.122 0.170
‡ † ‡ ‡13 0.317 0.049 0.146 0.39 0.090 0.122
‡ † ‡ ‡14 0.268 0.073 0.098 0.366 0.090 0.090
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡15 0.341 0.024 0.073 0.34 0.049 0.120
♦ † ‡, , and indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels with the null being the reversal rate in the arbitrage
treatment (2 or 3) is equal to the rate in the non-arbitrage baseline (treatment 1).
Note: arbitrage was introduced in round 6.
risk aversion over time. Second, we control for time invariant subject attributes with a random effects
estimation.
4 . Results and discussion
Table 1 establishes the existence of the preference reversal phenomenon in the laboratory setting,
and how the introduction of arbitrage significantly decreases the rate of reversals (i.e. increases the
Table 2
Random-effects estimates for treatment 1
Round Market Non-market
b b b b b b1 2 3 1 2 3
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡1 2.95 20.61 0.041 2.93 20.58 0.036
(0.37) (0.092) (0.0075) (0.37) (0.092) (0.0075)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡2 2.83 20.56 0.035 3.03 20.62 0.04
(0.37) (0.094) (0.0079) (0.37) (0.092) (0.0077)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡3 2.76 20.52 0.03 2.98 20.59 0.036
(0.37) (0.090) (0.0073) (0.36) (0.088) (0.0072)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡4 2.75 20.52 0.029 3.2 20.70 0.049
(0.38) (0.093) (0.0077) (0.37) (0.092) (0.0076)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡5 2.93 20.59 0.039 2.98 20.59 0.036
(0.37) (0.091) (0.0074) (0.37) (0.090) (0.0074)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡6 2.94 20.60 0.038 2.94 20.57 0.035
(0.37) (0.090) (0.0074) (0.37) (0.092) (0.0076)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡7 2.89 20.58 0.037 2.84 20.54 0.032
(0.36) (0.089) (0.0074) (0.37) (0.093) (0.0078)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡8 2.8 20.55 0.034 3.04 20.62 0.04
(0.37) (0.092) (0.0076) (0.37) (0.092) (0.076)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡9 2.76 20.52 0.03 2.93 20.57 0.034
(0.37) (0.093) (0.0078) (0.37) (0.092) (0.077)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡10 2.89 20.57 0.035 2.79 20.51 0.028
(0.37) (0.094) (0.0079) (0.37) (0.093) (0.0079)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡11 2.78 20.54 0.033 2.97 20.58 0.035
(0.38) (0.094) (0.0073) (0.37) (0.089) (0.0073)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡12 2.74 20.52 0.03 2.97 20.59 0.036
(0.37) (0.087) (0.0073) (0.37) (0.092) (0.0074)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡13 2.82 20.56 0.035 2.96 20.59 0.036
(0.38) (0.093) (0.0077) (0.37) (0.091) (0.0075)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡14 2.73 20.52 0.031 2.96 20.59 0.037
(0.38) (0.096) (0.0081) (0.37) (0.091) (0.0075)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡15 2.93 20.59 0.039 2.93 20.57 0.035
(0.38) (0.096) (0.0082) (0.37) (0.092) (0.0073)
2
x 701.26 672.22(45)
(P-value) (,0.000) (,0.000)
2R̄ 0.552 0.542
N 615 615
‡Standard errors in parentheses unless stated otherwise. Indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
rate of rational choices). Prior to arbitrage (round 6), reversal rates across treatments were not
significantly different at any standard level. After four rounds of arbitrage, reversal rates were
significantly lower in the arbitrage treatments relative to no-arbitrage baseline (P-values,0.020). In
the later rounds, the institutional discipline from arbitrage was highly significant in generating more
rational choices.
Now we turn to the issue of subjects’ love of skewness and whether preferences remained stable
when people adjusted behavior to act more rational. Tables 2–4 report panel estimates of Eq. (5)
Table 3
Random-effects estimates for treatment 2
Round Market Non-market
b b b b b b1 2 3 1 2 3
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡1 2.98 20.61 0.039 2.94 20.60 0.038
(0.36) (0.085) (0.0071) (0.37) (0.091) (0.0074)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡2 2.97 20.61 0.039 2.75 20.52 0.03
(0.38) (0.097) (0.0088) (0.37) (0.092) (0.0076)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡3 2.89 20.58 0.036 2.96 20.60 0.038
(0.37) (0.093) (0.0077) (0.36) (0.089) (0.0073)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡4 2.89 20.58 0.036 2.88 20.57 0.035
(0.38) (0.097) (0.0082) (0.37) (0.091) (0.0073)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡5 2.77 20.52 0.029 2.86 20.56 0.034
(0.37) (0.093) (0.0076) (0.37) (0.093) (0.0076)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡6 2.91 20.58 0.036 2.67 20.49 0.028
(0.36) (0.087) (0.0073) (0.38) (0.096) (0.0082)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡7 2.97 20.61 0.039 2.96 20.60 0.039
(0.36) (0.087) (0.0074) (0.37) (0.091) (0.0074)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡8 2.94 20.60 0.038 2.77 20.52 0.031
(0.37) (0.091) (0.0074) (0.37) (0.092) (0.0074)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡9 2.75 20.52 0.03 2.98 20.61 0.039
(0.37) (0.092) (0.0076) (0.36) (0.088) (0.0071)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡10 2.96 20.60 0.038 2.97 20.61 0.039
(0.36) (0.089) (0.0073) (0.38) (0.01) (0.0088)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡11 2.88 20.57 0.035 2.89 20.58 0.036
(0.37) (0.091) (0.0073) (0.37) (0.093) (0.0077)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡12 2.87 20.56 0.034 2.89 20.58 0.036
(0.37) (0.093) (0.0076) (0.38) (0.097) (0.0082)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡13 2.69 20.49 0.028 2.77 20.52 0.029
(0.38) (0.096) (0.0082) (0.37) (0.093) (0.0076)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡14 2.96 20.60 0.039 2.91 20.579 0.036
(0.37) (0.088) (0.0074) (0.36) (0.087) (0.0073)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡15 2.77 20.53 0.031 2.97 20.61 0.039
(0.37) (0.092) (0.0074) (0.36) (0.087) (0.0074)
2
x 666.87 666.87(45)
(P-value) (,0.000) (,0.000)
2R̄ 0.540 0.540
N 615 615
‡Standard errors in parentheses unless stated otherwise. Indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
Table 4
Random-effects estimates for treatment 3
Round Market Non-market
b b b b b b1 2 3 1 2 3
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡1 2.87 20.58 0.037 2.74 20.53 0.032
(0.37) (0.093) (0.0076) (0.38) (0.094) (0.0077)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡2 2.73 20.53 0.031 2.91 20.6 0.038
(0.38) (0.093) (0.0076) (0.38) (0.093) (0.0077)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡3 2.9 20.6 0.039 2.76 20.53 0.032
(0.37) (0.093) (0.0079) (0.38) (0.096) (0.0080)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡4 2.75 20.54 0.032 2.74 20.53 0.031
(0.38) (0.094) (0.0077) (0.37) (0.096) (0.0079)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡5 2.8 20.55 0.034 2.81 20.56 0.035
(0.37) (0.090) (0.0074) (0.37) (0.092) (0.0075)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡6 2.73 20.53 0.032 2.86 20.58 0.037
(0.38) (0.095) (0.0076) (0.37) (0.091) (0.0075)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡7 2.81 20.56 0.035 2.78 20.55 0.034
(0.38) (0.093) (0.0075) (0.40) (0.010) (0.0089)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡8 2.74 20.53 0.032 2.73 20.53 0.032
(0.38) (0.094) (0.0077) (0.38) (0.092) (0.0074)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡9 2.91 20.59 0.038 2.87 20.58 0.037
(0.38) (0.093) (0.0077) (0.37) (0.093) (0.0076)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡10 2.76 20.53 0.032 2.73 20.53 0.031
(0.38) (0.096) (0.0080) (0.38) (0.093) (0.0076)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡11 2.74 20.53 0.031 2.9 20.6 0.039
(0.39) (0.096) (0.0079) (0.37) (0.093) (0.0079)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡12 2.81 20.56 0.035 2.75 20.54 0.034
(0.37) (0.092) (0.0075) (0.38) (0.094) (0.0077)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡13 2.86 20.58 0.037 2.8 20.55 0.034
(0.37) (0.091) (0.0075) (0.37) (0.091) (0.0074)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡14 2.78 20.55 0.034 2.73 20.53 0.032
(0.40) (0.010) (0.0089) (0.38) (0.095) (0.0078)
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡15 2.73 20.53 0.032 2.81 20.56 0.035
(0.38) (0.092) (0.0074) (0.38) (0.093) (0.0075)
2
x 647.86 647.86(45)
(P-value) (,0.000) (,0.000)
2R̄ 0.532 0.532
N 615 615
‡Standard errors in parentheses unless stated otherwise. Indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
6across treatments. For each treatment, the market and non-market setting is estimated separately. To
estimate how preferences and risk aversion changes within a setting over time, we interact the
measures (b , b , andb ) with time period indicator variables. Recallb measures the preferences1 2 3 1
over the mean of returns,b measures the preference for risk, andb measures the preference for2 3
skewness. We expect subjects are risk averse and prefer lotteries with greater expected payoffs and
6Hausman and Lagrange multiplier tests indicate a highly significant preference for a random effects specification.
higher skewness (b . 0, b ,0, andb . 0). Our null hypothesis is that risk aversion and skewness1 2 3
preferences remain stable even as people correct preference reversal behavior in the face of a new
context—market-like arbitrage.
Results in the market-like and non-market settings across all three treatments confirm our
expectations. In each model, estimated coefficients for the early periods were significantly different
than zero and carried signs consistent with our expectations. Subjects preferred lotteries with higher
expected returns (b .0), were risk averse (b , 0) and preferred lotteries with higher skewness1 2
(b . 0). One might imagine a link between the love for skewness and preference reversals—but the3
results from the later periods contradict this notion. In the later periods, estimated coefficients
remained significantly different than zero—indicating that subjects were still risk averse and preferred
7higher expected returns and skewness. But as the reversal rates declined in the market and
non-market setting due to the introduction of arbitrage, people maintained their preferences and
aversion to risk. Arbitrage caused people to reconsider and correct the inconsistency of their
preferences and values, but the reconciliation of preferences and values arose from value adjust-
ments—not preference adjustments. Subjects stood by the preference ordering he or she first set up;
rather they realigned preference choices and stated values by reducing their willingness to pay for the
risky lottery.
5 . Conclusion
Are preferences for skewness fixed or fungible across context? Our results suggest they can be
fixed. We find evidence that supports the economist’s presumption that preferences are stable across
market-like arbitrage and non-market contexts. People preferred skewness both before and after
market-like arbitrage stopped them from reversing their preferences. Preference reversal behavior
stopped not because people change their predilection for skewness; rather people stopped overpricing
the long shot once arbitrage put a cost on this behavior. Additional research exploring the robustness
of our findings would be useful.
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